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[EDITOR'S NOTE: Six problems in legal education, much discussed recently, were posed by the Editors of this Review to a number of the top
educators in the legal world.
These questions were and are frankly difficult and controversial, but
their answers are important to our system of legal education and to our
society. Capsule answers given by these concerned educators are believed to be interesting and significant. Each is a personal rather than
a representative opinion.
Brief answers such as these, of course, are not expected to be, nor
do they pretend to be, complete or profound. Their purpose is to indicate
succinctly the approach of some law school educators who may be considered "opinion makers" to difficult policy problems of legal education.]
I. Curriculum Structuring in Legal Education.
The Problem: At least two main, but different approaches to curriculum
planning have been adopted by most American law schools. One
approach, the more conventional of the two, provides for a fully
structured course of study, consisting of a selected plan of required
courses. Indeed, in some states, the supreme court, bar admission
authority, or other accrediting agency prescribes many required
courses, thus in effect making a structured curriculum obligatory for
law schools. A second approach calls for a great deal of self-determination and freedom of choice among courses by law students.
Following this approach, a law school will limit the number of required courses it prescribes, and offers many electives, thus allowing
the student to pursue those areas which he finds most interesting.
Question: Which approach to curriculum planning do you believe will
best prepare law students for the practice of law?
I Prof., Southern Methodist University School of Law.
2

Prof., University of Michigan Law School.

3 Prof., Brooklyn Law School.
4 Prof., University of Tulsa College of Law.
5 Prof., Indiana University Indianapolis Law School.
6 Prof., University of Puerto Rico School of Law.
7 Prof., University of Texas School of Law.
8 Prof., Cleveland State University College of Law.
9 Prof., University of Florida Law Center.
10 Prof., Columbia University School of Law.
11 Prof., University of Louisville School of Law.
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Answers:
Prof. Bromberg: I favor self-determination in an age of increasing
specialization of lawyers and increasing insistence by students on pursuing their own goals. However, self-determination works well only if
(1) there is an ample supply of electives and (2) the courses are broad
enough that the student sees many important interrelations in law. The
main drawback to self-determination is not theoretical but financial; it is
a very expensive curriculum to offer.
Prof. Conard: Neither approach, as you outline them, is desirable.
A curriculum should be about half required and half elective. The required portion should be prescribed by faculties; not by courts or legislatures.
Prof. Forkosch: Neither, in response to the language used in the
question(s) and the way in which these questions are phrased. You
have set forth two extremes (a real extreme in the second question
would be to permit complete selection among only electives). In my
view there are "musts" or required courses, e.g., contracts, which cannot
be evaded (not avoided) by students in the guise of "electives." These
are essential for many reasons. However, these required courses should
be boiled down to the minimum required and electives (within the financial ability of the school involved) offered subject, however, to guidance
and counselling by faculty advisors. In other words a student should not
choose an elective because it fits into his schedule, or there's an "easy"
course (or prof) involved, etc. Electives are for definite purposes and
ends and these should be adhered to.
Prof. Hager: Assuming, as the question does, that the curriculum
should be planned to prepare students for the practice of law, and assuming further that the question refers to "general practice," the fully structured course will best prepare the students for legal practice. The instructors will, or should, know better which courses are more "practical" in the sense that the courses relate to what lawyers actually do.
Prof. Kelso: Curriculum planning for law practice is best approached
by combining recommendations from practitioners and faculty members.
The result will be a blend of electives and requireds. The primary value
of electives is that they permit faculty members to teach in areas where
they are most qualified. Required courses insure that some faculty members at each school will be qualified in areas practitioners judge basic to
their work. Only a small number of credits should be available to students in a law practice curriculum primarily because the students find
the area interesting.
Prof. Mayda: a) Minimum obligatory core: Introduction to law (jurisprudential framework): legal methods and bibliography; b) Various
courses outlining the function of the law in problem areas: poverty, civil
rights, urbanization, environmental, international and world affairs; c)
Rest of the curriculum with minimum structuring so as to make sense
and prevent shopping for easy professors and courses.
Prof. Mersky: I would favor the second approach, limiting the number of required courses and offering many electives.
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Prof. Oleck: A balanced mix of substantive and adjective, theoretical
and clinical, and mandatory and elective training is best, of course. What
is the best mix is the real question. As to that, hardly two opinions will
agree. In my opinion, the basic law course should require the 8 or 10
currently required (torts, contracts, etc.) courses, and still be able to
offer about a third of the school's first-law-degree program in elective and
clinical and specialty courses.
Prof. Probert: Since there seems less agreement than ever before on
the "fundamentals" of legal education, a preponderance of electives wins
my nod. There should be a required core, not just of subjects, but of
teaching approaches as well, if nothing else to counteract student tendencies to take the easy way out come elective time.
Prof. Rosenberg: I do not have a categorical answer. A good faculty,
good student body, high level of interest, good facilities, and good materials for study can well prepare for responsible professional practice,
whether the curriculum is tightly obligatory or free-choice. In short,
factors other than the degree of curricular structure are more important
in good results. Structure vs. free-choice may play a role for some students, but in the overall, I believe it not a dominant factor.
Prof. Volz: A middle course, wherein the first two years of study
are largely prescribed with broad electives and seminar offerings in the
third year.
Hl. Tenured Professor Who Should be Dismissed.
The Problem: It long has been recognized that tenure provides an important measure of professional job security for educators and, in effect,
preserves and perpetuates academic freedom. Without attempting
to minimize the cogency of these points, some legal educators and
law students have expressed concern that tenure now, often, intimidates administrators and serves as a shield for professors who should
be dismissed. They contend that, unless the professor is guilty of
blatant moral turpitude or is in violation of his contract (and often
not even then), he cannot be dismissed, despite the fact that his performance as a teacher is less than adequate. They say that dismissal
of a tenured professor for incompetence or bad character almost
never happens despite many examples of abuse of the tenure
privilege.
Question: What should be done about the professor who has tenured
status but who should be dismissed because of incompetence or
worse, when administrators fail to act?
Answers:
Prof. Bromberg: Faculty, students or alumni should urge the administrators to act. Short of dismissal, there are ways of encouraging and
pressuring for improvement of the faculty member or mitigating the
damages he causes, including (1) not raising salary, or perhaps even
reducing it; (2) setting course load (high or low, depending on the circumstances); (3) assigning him to courses where he is most effective;
(4) counselling on deficiencies and providing incentives to overcome
Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1971
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them. Some of these raise due process issues similar to those in dismissal. But if good cause is present, administrators should not hesitate to
move for dismissal. They are in a much better position to act if there is
a well established, fair system of student evaluation and peer evaluation.
Prof. Conard: (1) If administrators fail to act, nothing can be done.
Recall by anyone else would destroy authority; (2) In order to help administrators act, systematic observation and evaluation of professors
should be made by colleagues and students.
Prof. Forkosch: I don't like the statement of facts and even less the
question as phrased. I start with the proposition that a teacher, like any
other person, has a "job," but, further, that this "job" also has about it
aspects which make it quite different from the ordinary one. For example, a punch-press operator doesn't have the coin-face fears that a teacher
has if he confronts a witch-hunting authority; nor does the punch-press
operator have to be on his toes daily and keep up with his field; nor does
he have to have "approval" from anyone but a supervisor, i.e., one boss.
And more can be said. I don't go into concepts of "free speech" and
"freedom of the mind," etc., etc. All this is on the side of tenure in the
strictest sense of the word. And the concept of tenure, springing as it
does in the classical ages from such fears and freedoms, cannot be dismissed cavalierly when we think of the Joe McCarthy and current years.
Your problem and your question "assume" a high degree of incompetence, and the conclusion follows that the prof "should" be dismissed, i.e.,
there is no doubt that he's bad, can't be aided, will not change, etc.
In other words, he's a bad apple and so rotten that he'll spoil everyone
he touches. Automatically there's no choice, he must go. So must the
rotten judge. So must the rotten President. The Constitution provides
for impeachment, and ditto judges. Our present method of impeachment, i.e., charges, hearing, etc., is limited (so you say in your problem)
to situations incapable of being met. Which gives this rotten prof a lifetime sinecure to make others rotten. Well, why can't (a) he be transferred; (b) given an office job; (c) etc., as to any other reasonable alternative (don't forget his peers elected him to this position). For example,
if he's become senile you just don't fire him willy nilly. And, I will confess, finally, that if, after all reasonable alternatives have been tried and
failed, and that's it, then, as with Pope, "lest one good custom corrupt the
world," he must be let go.
Prof. Hager: The question, in asking what should be done when administrators (which I assume includes the Dean) fail to act, leaves any
solution of the problem to the faculty and students. I see no legal solution that these two bodies, individually or together, can provide.
Prof. Kelso: Since it's ordinarily up to a professor-turned-administrator to decide whether another professor is competent, the question, as
phrased, is like asking "what should be done about the accused who is
guilty but who is acquitted by a jury?" The administrator gets information from a number of sources and ordinarily is in the best position
to judge. However, assuming the question's unlikely premise, I suppose
the answer must be to dismiss or otherwise sanction the administrators

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol20/iss3/4

4

LEGAL EDUCATION 1971

445

for not doing their job. Since you may really be asking how faculty,
alumni, or student input can best impact on the situation, I should note
that a University Ombudsman can be a useful person.
Prof. Mayda: In our school, a recommendation of personnel committee on which the dean would not act could be carried to the facultystudent meeting. Their affirmative vote, not acted upon by the university
administration, would give basis for a court action. (Very hypothetical
situation!)
Prof. Mersky: I believe professors with tenured status should be
dismissed because of incompetence.
Prof. Oleck: Some administrators' natural distaste for unpleasant
duties, some facultymen's human tendencies to concentrate on privileges
more than on obligations, recent decisions of some judges, and a vague
public resentment of endlessly increasing fund drives and taxes, may result in solution of the tenure question by legislated control by politicians
instead of by academic people. Meanwhile, of course, administrators
should be supported in doing what they are duty bound to do; and removed if they will not do that. Ultimately, the students are the ones
injured most by retention of "bad professors," and the students can complain or even bring legal action.
Prof. Probert: Administrators are supposed to be intimidated by tenure arrangements, or if you prefer, cautious and respectful. I would far
rather have a few incompetent teachers around than control of job status
by administrators or politicians or benefactors. If a man is an incompetent teacher-and if the criteria are clear enough-then the faculty should
rehabilitate him or get him another job. If he is near retirement, he
might be paired in team-teaching efforts.
Prof. Rosenberg: The assumption of the question is that a tenured
professor has been shown (by fair procedures) to be unfit. I assume the
showing has been made before a duly established tribunal and the tribunal has made the finding of unfitness. If the rules provide for dismissal
in that event and the administrators fail to do so, they can be compelled
by higher university or public authorities to act properly.
Prof. Volz: Student action is the only course. It may take the form
of a committee calling on the dean or the president of the university or
a faculty rating system.
IH. Academic Waivers for Disadvantaged and/or Minority Groups.
The Problem: A relatively new concept in the area of legal education, as
in education generally, is that of academic credential waiver for disadvantaged and/or minority group students. This concept provides
for two different standards for admission into law schools, a lower
(or at least a different) standard being applied for disadvantaged
students. Critics of academic waiver contend that this policy is a
breach of responsibility on the parts of America's law schools. They
argue that law schools have the responsibility of training professionals, and that a single standard of excellence must be required
for admission to law schools. Proponents say that reverse discrimination is owed to black and other disadvantaged people.
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Question: Should academic credential waivers in admissions policies be
granted by law schools?
Answers:
Prof. Bromberg: There are at least two distinct arguments for waivers: (1) the need for more minority group members to enter the profession, and (2) the probability that some (many?) minority group members have potential as good as anyone else, but less developed because
of poverty, poor schools and other forms of discrimination. The first
argument suggests that anyone likely to meet the minimum standards
for entry into the profession should be admitted to law school until a fair
balance is obtained in the profession. A school with selective admissions
and aspirations to excellence will have a hard time justifying lower
standards merely to fill a sort of quota, and I cannot advocate this sort
of reverse discrimination. The second argument provides a much better
justification for admission waivers. But I think it must be based on a determination that waiver students will be as good as average students in
the school by the time they graduate, and a reasonable probability that
this can be done. It may mean tutorial, extra class sessions, special lectures or other supportive arrangements. With this kind of commitment,
I'm greatly in favor of waivers.
Prof. Canard: There should be no "waivers," but very different
weights should be given to test scores of minority students. In fact test
scores should be given less weight than now for all students.
Prof. Forkosch: Yes, to some extent, and in a limited fashion. Notice,
however, that it is only "admission" which is involved. Thus graduation
is kept on whatever high plane the school involved desires to maintain it.
What is being done is to permit Johnny Underprivileged the opportunity
to compete, but in the competition he must keep up with the others. I
won't go into why I think so. But, coupled with such admissions is the
question, to what extent are admissions policies to be reduced? This is
another problem. Also, there is a "must" involved-you just don't let
Johnny Underprivileged enter and then say, swim. Throw him into the
water but let him wade, give him lessons at the outset to bring him up to
so-called par, or aid him as he gets along in the first year (perhaps even
a part of the second year). In other words, just admitting him won't help
unless he gets some additional aid. What this is, how administered, etc.,
are other problems.
Prof. Hager: I must answer no with considerable reluctance and
sympathy for the disadvantaged. I would answer "yes" if the school had
the human and other resources to work closely and intensely with these
disadvantaged persons so that by graduation, they would be on more of
a parity with those who entered with better qualifications. This is not
true, however, in most of the law schools of the country at the present
time.
Prof. Kelso: Waiver of academic credentials should not be granted
because of background to anyone who lacks minimum competence.
However, a bar better suited to society's needs may be produced if academic performance is not the sole criterion for recruitment and admishttps://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol20/iss3/4
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sion to each law school. As a general proposition, however, I think we
should strive to enlarge the number of interested high-performance students from disadvantaged and/or minority groups and so be in a better
position to enlarge the background-base of the profession.
Prof. Mayda: Provisional admission; academic and financial help to
catch up and stay longer in the school. But not double standard!
Prof. Mersky: Yes, I do think academic credential waivers in admissions policies should be granted.
Prof. Oleck: An emergency situation requires (and justifies) emergency remedies. We face such a situation in our society. Of course, use
of a different standard for blacks or other special groups might be said
to violate the technical aspect of the rule of "equal protection of the
laws," though not its spirit. But we ought to waive the rule, by general
consent, at least for a short while, in order to start to cure the disease
of bigotry and racism. This is not reparations, but is simple self-interest
if we still view our society as a single nation and its members as "fellow
citizens"-not to mention "fellow humans."
Prof. Probert: There is no reasonable alternative to experimentation
with admission criteria. Until suitable national criteria are achieved,
then ad hoc experiments are necessary.
Prof. Rosenberg: My opinion is that discrimination on grounds of
race is wrong. Period. Yet the number of students of disadvantaged
backgrounds in better law schools must be increased. One way out of
the dilemma is to set up a color-blind "socially conscious division" in the
law school, admitting a proportion of the first year class on grounds of
potential contribution to melioration of social problems, based on background, achievements, and personal traits other than the standard ones.
These should be as objective as possible. Once admitted into the school,
the students in the "socially conscious" division would not be distinguished from normal admittees and only the individuals in question
would know the separate basis of their admission. Once in, they would
have to meet the school's standards.
Prof. Volz: In admissions the objective must be to determine the
true ability of the student. If a poor LSAT score is based on lack of experience with this type of test or to slow reading, an adjustment in test
score is not a waiver but the application of a truer standard of measuring
individual worth. Remedial programs and adjustments as suggested
above are defensible; a double standard is not.
IV. Law School Discipline Codes.
The Problem: Law student-drafted codes of rights and responsibilities,
seeking to regulate student conduct, advocate intra-disciplinary
measures to be executed by law student judiciary boards. Most
school administrators, however, favor administrative control over
student discipline. There is disagreement about where prime disciplinary authority should be placed.
Question: With whom should disciplinary authority rest, and to what
extent? What kind of disciplinary code do you advocate?
Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1971
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Answers:
Prof. Bromberg: I'm for authority in the students, preferably exercised by a prosecutor, court, etc. elected by students or appointed by
elected students. If this can't achieve reasonable discipline, I doubt that
administrative or faculty action can. I don't see any universals for the
kind of code; it should depend on the school, the students and the
situation.
Prof. Conard: Disciplinary authority should be apportioned-on
some subjects exclusively to faculty, and some exclusively to students
with some shared.
Prof. Forkosch: The way the question is put, in the light of the
problem presented, controls my response. I favor giving students disciplinary authority as between and among students when "student conduct" does not unduly affect others or create any school-community problems. Within their own activities let them control.
The problem, however, is what happens when students either seek
authority and control outside of this area I have mentioned, or press in

ways other than speech, petitions, requests, etc. for this authority. Here
two groups are involved, the students on the one hand, and the administration on the other, with the public a silent spectator at the outset. On
this problem I have no a priori answer but desire to check out the particular facts in a particular situation, etc., etc., with the basic view that
students must be encouraged and not stifled but only up to a point-that
"point" is one I have not thought through and "created," if ever I can do
this.
Prof. Hager: The ultimate disciplinary authority should rest with
the administrators who cannot completely surrender this authority. I
would favor a code such as my school has--one prepared by the students
and approved by the faculty with a student board having almost exclusive jurisdiction over violations by students of the honor code. The
faculty would serve as a review board and could suspend the code at any
time that it is obvious that the students are not implementing it properly.
Prof. Kelso: The authority to discipline should rest with the person
or groups responsible for teaching the relevant behavior and/or attesting
to its existence. This calls for some division and sharing of authority between faculty, students and administration. I doubt that there is any one
"right" pattern, so long as the pattern which exists is known and respected. Continuity with past customs is important in this respect, as is periodic re-examination.
Prof. Mayda: Obviously it must rest with the students in that it gives
them a higher sense of responsibility. Administrative action must come
in where the students fail to maintain implied or explicit minimum
standards.
Prof. Mersky: I advocate the student disciplinary code.
Prof. Oleck: Drafting of disciplinary codes should be done by experts in drafting (law professors) with law student collaboration on an
almost, but not quite, equal level of adoption-vote power. Ultimate disciplinary power, as a practical matter, should be vested in law school adhttps://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol20/iss3/4
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ministrators, with student and faculty cooperation provided for. Some
matters, such as purely-personal-taste-conduct, should be governed entirely by student-drafted and student-enforced rules and judiciary organizations.
Prof. Probert: Certain kinds of disciplinary problems are as well
handled by students as anyone, such as Stealing or Cheating. The current
worry concerns sanctions against political activity on campus. Because
it is such a mixed bag, discipline should not be solely in the hands either
of administration or students. They and the faculty should all be represented. Faculty should not be by-passed because their interests often are
subtly involved.
Prof. Rosenberg: A wholly student-set, student-implemented code,
so far as professional responsibility and conscience of the faculty were
not abdicated. For example, if the student code or tribunal should fail
to enforce sanctions against students who assaulted students or faculty,
disrupted classes, etc., the faculty should reserve a function.
Prof. Volz: A student honor code applying to law examinations, to
use of the library, and to respect for the property of others should be
administered by the law students themselves and they should make the
recommendations concerning the disciplinary action to be followed, which
normally should be observed by the dean and faculty. On matters not
covered by an honor code the decisions should be left to the faculty and
consultation with a proper student committee if appropriate.
V. Clinical Empires in Legal Education.
The Problem: Law schools traditionally have been viewed as mainly
"academic" centers, where students learn the theory and philosophy
of the law. Recently, however, some law schools have emphasized
"clinical" or "how-to" programs, in an effort to train students in
more practical aspects of law practice. Proponents of heavy clinical
programs contend that internship and work-study programs are the
best preparations for practice. Traditionalists, however, argue that
law school is the only opportunity to learn the theories and philosophies of law, and that practical experience should be obtained after
graduation. The trend seems to be towards increasingly greater
clinical emphasis, while many faculty members and administrators
seek to head or work largely in their schools' clinical programs
rather than in teaching the traditional courses.
Question: Are law schools going too far with their clinical approach to
legal education, or not far enough?
Answers:
Prof. Bromberg: I have insufficient knowledge to know whether law
schools are going too far, or not far enough. But I am convinced that
"theory" can be taught far more effectively in "practical" context. On
this basis, I think our school is not going far enough, and I suspect the
same is true most places. The important thing is to overcome the separation of "theory" and "practice" by teaching them in a unified way.
Prof. Conard: Yes! Some are going too far, and some not far
enough. The increase in clinical work is desirable if coupled with: (1)
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Without these, it is a

fraud.
Prof. Forkosch: I am a "bug" on theory, reasoning, and applications
to practical problems, but I am also a "bug" on the practical applications
of theory. I find it impossible to learn in a vacuum, and also find that
whatever I have learned (in theory) assumes different shapes, degrees,
depths, and even concepts once applied to the test. I am therefore a
"bug" on work-study programs. I just don't see why an either-or approach is required. I want both. I teach reasoning in law, and also practice in law. Both make the lawyer. Both condition the lawyer. Both
make the man and the citizen. I reject either one or the other. To me
the only question is how and when the clinical will enter to illustrate and
make meaningful the theoretical.
Prof. Hager: The answer would depend upon the goal (or goals) of
the particular law school concerned. If the primary goal is to train students to practice law, the law schools are not going far enough with the
number, and quality, of clinical approaches to legal education. One great
difficulty is that most law schools do not seem to have decided upon what
the goals of legal education should be and consequently, try to be all
things to all students.
Prof. Kelso: To the extent that lack of resources is slowing the development of clinical programs, the law schools are not going far enough.
To the extent that programs are being set up simply because some grant
money is available, the schools are going too far. If clinical programs
involving actual practice are being continually evaluated and improved,
as the schools have tried to do with other innovations, the schools are
going just far and fast enough.
Prof. Mayda: The vocational tendencies in American law schools are
still strong and, in a rapidly changing world, detrimental. We need to
form legal minds able to face and solve problems 30 years into the unpredictable future. What goes against, including overemphasis, is wrong.
Prof. Mersky: I feel law schools are going too far with their clinical
approach to legal education.
Prof. Oleck: Some too far, but some not far enough. A good proportion of clinical experience is healthy; too much will tend to make mere
mechanics out of people who should become legal "artists." Faculty and
administrators' tendencies to adopt fads and to build empires are about
as strong, or small, in this as in other areas of legal education.
Prof. Probert: Clinical expansion is long overdue, but it should not
take command. Ideally there should be a combination of approaches, for
instance by a teaming of the generalist teacher and the specialist practitioner. The dichotomy between theory and practicality is illusory. The
specialist merely tends not to be able to articulate his underlying theory.
Neither he nor the student are apt to generalize beyond the ad hoc by
themselves, thus the need for one skillful in that dimension, relating little
pieces to the bigger fabric.
Prof. Rosenberg: As to clinical programs, law schools seem not the
best setting for them. If they are more important than learning drafting,
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writing, reasoning, analysis, etc. in a classroom setting, the law schools
should eliminate the final half-year or year and release students to the
more important work in law offices, prosecutors' bureaus, legal aid and
defender offices, etc., instead of charging students heavy tolls in the form
of tuition for the privilege of passing through the law school building on
their way to their clinical jobs.
Prof. Volz: The problem to date has been that an insufficient number
of law teachers have been interested in participating in clinical programs.
Certainly, law schools have not gone too far as a group. Some have not
gone far enough. Others are about right.
VI. Rights of Non-Tenured Teachers.
The Problem: The right to be infornied as to charges, and a hearing, for
a teacher who is to be dismissed, are inherent in the concept of tenure. The right to be told the reason for dismissal has long been recognized as primary in tenured status. Of late, however, some nontenured legal educators have claimed some of these rights of "tenure," arguing Constitutional or moral grounds-such as the claim of
right to a hearing before non-renewal of even a one-year untenured
contract of employment.
Question: What "tenure-type" rights should be afforded to non-tenured
law professors?
Answers:
Prof. Bromberg: Common courtesy calls for a statement of reasons
when a contract is allowed to expire. The school needs to be able to
articulate its reasons, if only to know whether it has identifiable standards and consistent applications. It should want to help the man understand his shortcomings, so he will profit at least to this extent from his
work at the school; this is a part of the school's educational function.
I strongly favor a statement of reasons, but I don't see it as a legal or
moral right of the faculty member.
Prof. Conard: Non-tenured professors should be protected against:
1) Expectations of removal which are not well-founded; 2) Ambiguity
in continuity of position; 3) Suspension or discharge during contract period; 4) Excessively long probationary periods.
Prof. Forkosch: I sympathize with non-tenured teachers. They are
in some type of infernal limbo during their hanging period. They must
be obsequious and yet not so, conservatives and yet libertarians, etc., etc.,
pleasing all and displeasing none. I'd hate to be in their place today.
How they can teach effectively in such an atmosphere is beyond me.
I look at it all in the light of students and school. We are here for the
students, and it is effective teaching which must be the goal. If we permit non-tenured professors to live in this fashion they'll teach in this fashion. And yet we can't just hire someone, not as yet "proven" (whatever
that means), and give him tenure. A reasonable mean permits "continuation" but with constant (periodic) conferences with others who must vote
on him, valuations in open so that he can correct himself, and, ultimately,
some opportunity to present his views before his judges. Depending on
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the number of years involved (say four years before tenure is to be
voted), I'd insist upon giving him a two-year (50%) continuation, then
a right to be told why his contract for one year would not be renewed
and his right to file papers in refutation. But that would end it for the
third or fourth years, save that for the last year he should be able to
meet his judges face to face. The third year would thus be the showdown year, for here he can't meet his judges but can only present his
"case" and permit the judges the opportunity to re-check and change
their findings and decisions. But in the fourth year he has now obtained
this additional "right."
But for a one-year non-tenured contract in a four-year situation I
don't think any "right" as above should be involved.
Prof. Hager: The non-tenured professor should be entitled to be told
the reason his contract is not being renewed, but he should have no other
tenure rights such as formal charges and a hearing to determine if he
should be dismissed or retained.
Prof. Kelso: Non-renewal should be possible without a hearing, if
mistakes are not to become living monuments. However, non-renewals
should not come as a surprise, and notice should be given in time for
the teacher to have a reasonable opportunity for securing other employment. Because a renewal judgment should be based upon adequate observation and evaluation, perhaps the minimum contracting time for fulltime teachers (other than visitors) should be two academic years.
Prof. Mayda: Expectation of a professional evaluation of their performance. Since the same people who hired a man will judge him after
his first year, they are not likely to suddenly become arbitrary. Unless
the man acted in a fashion not revealed before he was invited, e.g., instead of devoting himself to his formation as a law professor he becomes
an activist inside the school. This I believe is his right as a citizen, but
does not impose any corresponding duty on the school.
Prof. Mersky: They should have the right to be informed as to
charges, and a hearing.
Prof. Oleck: A teacher employed on tryout basis is morally entitled
to be told of his deficiencies if not to be re-hired, and legally entitled not
to be fired for no sound reason. But a requirement that he be given a
full-scale hearing before he can be fired is fatally restrictive on already
harried administrators. Until he earns and is granted tenure, a new
teacher should not have the privileges of tenured status. The old rules
as to test-year hiring are imperfect, but better than rules giving tenured
status in effect at first hiring of all new teachers.
Prof. Probert: Whatever else tenure may be, it is an allocation of
power to faculty decision. Experience on five law faculties, some of it
short, some lengthy, convinces me that faculty should have some sort of
say regarding the man on probation, the non-tenured individual. The
faculty should cast the decisive vote. But the administration should have
the power to initiate a more extensive consideration by means of a review within the college (for instance) in question; i.e., a hearing. The
probationer may not wish a review, preferring to slip out of the picture,
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etc., but he should be recognized as having a right in any event to know
why he is dismissed and to have some sort of review procedure where
his side of the situation may be heard. Perhaps the best alternative and
one readily foreseeable is a professors' union.
Prof. Rosenberg: Notice in advance of the grounds on which tenure
will be decided, provision of a careful record of the basis of decision, and
an opportunity for internal review via set procedures.
Prof. Volz: Counselling to correct deficiencies as the latter are disclosed. An oral meeting with the dean explaining the reasons for dismissal.
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